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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SUSAN H. EARLY, 
Respondent/Plaintiff 
v. 
DAVID W. EARLY, ., 
Anpo 1 ! ,\nf- /Defendant 
CASE NO. 890306-CA 
BRIEF Oi" APPELLANT 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
J U R I S D I C T I 0 N : 
The Court of Appeals lias aooellate jurisdiction 
- -
 : -. - .-.f \ r t- i c I o w " I : 
^ r f "i i 
• e c"~ i ' '! "H? *i or of Utah; 
: s ine no 
Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF . ROCEED1NCS EEiA)W: 
A civorco action has ns^no net/; en ti le par t i< y ; n M I a 
Decree of Divorce oas rranted to tno respondent, Mrs, Ear Ly. (R.776) 
-'•/;• ::-- : i •• +~-~ i n > d t ,f m.on for Order of Contempt 
and Judgment. . . . -5 . -;o r oti n * ^  respondent sought «:tji t.a i n. 
relief based upon th^ Decree. 
r
"'-' r:;-"' - -,: - •*• -' -n and Mrti-^n ~o- J11/'! merit 
'i:id Supporting Memorandum . . , ' ) • - ; lairing rp, JJ: on . ~ ;n 
behal " u^i-r t-he Decror , The ;ssuos v/ere submitted t' the court 
. * : • -
i
 •- ..-:.., ^,.--anua of the 
respective parties under Ru„e4~ - : ". , E .-, :;o .^-.ai test im^nv or 
other exhibits were given oi submitted zo the court. 
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An "Order and Judgment" was signed and entered by the 
court on April 17, 1989, the honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding 
(R.930) wherein the respondent was awarded most of the relief 
requested by her and the appellant's requested relief was denied. 
A "Notice of Appeal" was filed by the appellant on May 12, 
1989. This is an appeal from the Order and Judgment entered by 
the court on April 17, 1989. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: 
(1) Is the appellant responsible for property taxes on the 
home awarded to the respondent, Susan Early, which taxes were 
incurred after the entry of the Decree of Divorce? 
(2) Is the appellant entitled to a judgment, as well as 
an offset against amounts he owes respondent, for bills he paid 
which which had been incurred by Mrs. Early, which she had been 
ordered to pay pursuant to the Decree of Divorce? 
(3) Was the District Court in error in refusing to enter, 
as a minimum, a brief written statement setting forth the grounds 
for its decision as required in Rule 52(a)? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES: 
RULE 52(a), U.R.C.P.: (Pertinent part only) 
"The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided 
in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56 . . . ." 
59-2-1325, U.C.A. (1953 as amended): (Pertinent part only) 
"Ai_ -ixes, u.i -is '^t.iorwise specifically provided for 
under Sec. 59-2- L 326, or other law, unpaid at noon on 
November 30 c£ cich year following the date of levy, are 
delinquent, and the county treasurer shall close his office 
for the receipt of taxes until a delinquent list for 
publication has oeen prepared. If November 30 falls on 
a Sunday or :>ther legal holiday, taxes become delinquent 
at noon on the aay following the Sunday or legal holiday." 
STATEME.-l J\ -_:^  J^o^: 
(A: NATURE OF rTIE CASE: 
T h i r> i " n^ ly^ooi I f ropi -; c i ^-j ] "' ^ rcier i^d Judor-onf bv th<--
Third Lis::; . : ' . . , . : : . . . :.v; : )i . ^ . : ,
 ; , . , -• i • : , 
(B; BOURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, .ISrOflTION AND RELEVANT FACTS: 
1- '^  r- '1>-'-,-ro'];:i ;3 between "ho v irties n^^c^cc! ~xv> 
Novembe. ->, - <-:. '.he respondent, Susan F :::: , -.,
 : 
for divorce. (R.2) ' 
1 ' • . ' - • he c o u r s e ^ c ^h^ ^roceedir^?-, 
an Order \^> Nn^* Cause './as I M L U ;*; ; by resoonuent: in : arcrued * 
the commissioner-, '-heroin issues ^:ortji\ma f-' tempor iry i] inonTT 
*• ' • .- T d r-oortv, 
ot. :. , ;er^ argued ir, : i uied .-^ cn by ./:;y • z ;ojjr^.enaa;::.:r oy the 
commissioner, (See Addendum A) (R•318) 
? . < - • -.^- • • : • • ..-.-, -.nmended 
"that defendant maintain tho mortgage, \.i:-:, /nid ins irance 
payments on the parties1 home during the pendencv o~ :his ac^i 
1 i 1 1 o 11 I e r e x p e i I s e s i i i c i i r i e d :i : e g a r d i i e 1 I o i i i. e i * . 
plaintiff. (R.319) 
4. Mrs. Early's attorney filed an objection to the 
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recommendation upon several grounds (R.321), including requests 
for a receiver, an accounting of rents, greater alimony, greater 
child support, and fees for attorneys and appraisers. This 
objection was heard by the court in May of 1987, and on June 24, 
1987, the District Court entered a "Minute Entry", signed by Judge 
Moffat, wherein most of the relief recommended by the Commissioner 
was affirmed, with some exceptions which are not pertinent to the 
issues of this appeal. (See Addendum B) (R.398) By means of 
these two rulings, the court governed the payment of debts 
associated with the family residence during the pendency of the 
proceedings. 
5. The portion of the Commissioner's recommendation that 
was affirmed which is germane to this appeal is "that defendant 
maintain the mortgage, tax, and insurance payments on the parties1 
home during the pendency of this action." (R.319) 
6. The case ultimately came on for trial on August 8,9,10 
and 11, 1988, the honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding, and a 
subsequent hearing on October 20, 1988. 
7. Subsequent to the time of trial, and prior to a ruling 
by the court on the issues, the parties entered into a Stipulation 
and Property Settlement Agreement, dated October 13, 1988, wherein 
all issues between the parties were resolved. (R.789) (See Addendum 
C) 
8. On October 20, 1988, a default hearing was held by the 
-5-
court, wherein testimony was taken as to grounds and jurisdiction, 
and the Stipulation of the parties was approved. 
9. Subsequently, and prior to the entry of the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.785), and the Decree of Divorce (R.77 
a Mutual Release was signed by the parties, dated October 26, 1988. 
(R.802) This release was referred to in the Findings of Fact and 
was incorporated therein by interlineation by the parties. (R.786) 
(See Addendum D) 
10. The Decree of Divorce (R.776) was entered by the 
court on October 28, 1988. 
11. On or about December 9, 1988, after other related 
correspondence, counsel for respondent submitted a letter to 
appellant's counsel outlining a claim to various sums of money. 
(R.906,909) 
12. No agreement or settlement being reached, the 
respondent, Susan Early, then filed a motion, dated February 7, 
1989, and styled Motion for Order of Contempt and Judgment and 
Supporting Memorandum (R.875), wherein she claimed that the 
appellant had not paid her certain amounts due under the Decree 
of Divorce, that he be found in contempt and that a judgment be 
entered against him for the amounts due. This motion was supported 
by an affidavit signed by the respondent. (R.863) (See Addendum E) 
13. The appellant, David Early, responded with an 
objection and his own motion for counter-relief under a motion 
styled Objection and Motion for Judgment and Supporting Memorandum, 
dated February 28, 1989. (R.905) As with the respondent's motion, 
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Mr. Early's objection and motion was supported by an accompanying 
affidavit. (R.909) (See Addendum F) 
14. Mrs. Early, the respondent, made demand for reimbursement 
of bills owing to Utah Power & Light, Mountain Fuel, U.S. West, 
expenses for the Audi automobile and taxes on the home awarded to 
her, all prorated through October 27, 1988 (the date of the signing 
of the Decree of Divorce). This demand was made by virtue of the 
recommendation of the Commissioner, as well as the order of Judge 
Moffat. It was conceded by the appellant below that the debts 
for the utilities and the prorated support and alimony for the 
month of October, 1988, were proper expenses and agreed to pay 
same. However, the appellant disputed the claim for the taxes 
on the home awarded to the respondent for reasons more fully set 
forth in our argument below. He also made demand for reimbursement 
of monies paid on bills incurred by Mrs. Early after the date of 
separation. 
15. A "Request for Ruling" was filed by Mrs. Early. (R.922) 
16. After considering the memoranda of the parties the court 
responded with a "Minute Entry" opinion granting a money judgment 
to Mrs. Early (R.919), and subsequently the court signed an "Order 
and Judgment" dated April 17, 1989. (R.925) The motion for 
contempt was denied by the court in an Amended Minute Entry.(R.923) 
17. As part of its ruling the court entered judgment not only 
for the amounts Mr. Early admitted were due Mrs. Early, but also 
entered judgment for the prorated amount due for taxes on the 
family residence which had been awarded to Mrs. Early. The court 
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also denied Mr. Early's request for an offset and for a judgment 
for amounts he had claimed and had more fully set forth in his 
supporting affidavit. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS: 
(A) REAL PROPERTY TAXES: Commissioner Peuler recommended 
that Mr. Early " . . . maintain the mortgage, tax, and insurance 
payments on the parties1 home during the pendency of this action 
. . . . " (R.319) Prior to and during the pendency of the 
proceedings the home was subject to a general mortgage lien which 
covered various assets of the parties. The appellant, Mr. Early, 
paid all obligations required under that mortgage obligation. 
Said mortgage did not require an impound for taxes and insurance, 
and therefore, no such items became due and payable as a condition 
of maintaining the mortgage. The taxes on the residence did not 
become due until November 30, 1988, per 59-2-1325, U.C.A., more 
than a month after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. Appellant 
should not have been made to pay such taxes. 
(B) AMOUNTS OWING TO APPELLANT WHICH WERE DENIED: Paragraph 
12 of the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement (R.796) 
provides, in part, that "the plaintiff agrees to assume and pay 
all separate debts and liabilities which she has incurred subse-
quent to the separation of the parties . . . ." The Decree of 
Divorce also provides that she will pay said debts. Mrs. Early 
incurred a substantial number of bills after the separation date whi 
Mr. Early had to pay, and for which Mr. Early demanded a setoff 
and reimbursement. The court refused this request despite the 
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clear language of the Decree and the Stipulation providing 
that she was to pay such debts. This was in error. 
(C) WRITTEN BASIS FOR RULING: The District Court failed to 
set forth any written basis for its ruling. The District Court 
should have issued a brief written statement setting forth the 
basis for its ruling per Rule 52(a)', U.R.C.P. The parties are 
entitled to know the basis for the court's ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERREDIN AWARDING THE RESPONDENT A 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT FOR A PRO RATED SHARE OF 
THE REAL PROPERTY TAXES ON THE HOME AWARDED TO THE 
RESPONDENT BY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
During the course of the proceedings, early on in the 
action between the parties, Mrs. Early brought on for hearing an 
Order to Show Cause wherein she sought various forms of relief, 
including a question of who should pay certain debts of the 
parties. As part of the recommendation issued by Commissioner 
Sandra Peuler the court recommended that " . . . defendant maintain 
the mortgage, tax, and insurance payments on the parties' home 
during the pendency of this actionfM (R.319) Judge Moffat, in a 
subsequent hearing on Mrs. Early's rejection of the Commissioner's 
recommendation, affirmed this part of the recommendation. (R.398) 
After the Decree of Divorce was entered in October of 1988, 
Mrs. Early initiated a proceeding in February of 1989 wherein 
she sought a judgment against the appellant for certain sums of 
money she claimed were owed to her. (R.875) This motion was 
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supported by Mrs, Earlyfs affidavit. (R.863) She claimed that 
since the court had ordered him to pay all tax payments on the 
property during the pendency of the proceedings Mr. Early was 
obligated to pay a pro rata share to the date of the Decree of 
Divorce in October of 1988. With this Mr. Early disagrees. 
In Mr. Early's response, including his affidavit (R.906, 
910), he makes it clear that there were no monthly house payments 
on the home of the parties per se, but rather, the home and other 
property owned by the Earlys was security for a separate loan 
obligation. This separate debt required no impound for taxes 
and insurance, nor were there any separate payments for taxes and 
insurance during the pendency of the proceedings. (R.910) The 
only obligation was the monthly payment on the overall obligation 
secured by the home and the other property. These monthly 
payments were made by Mr. Early as they became due (R.906), and 
as a result Mr. Early fulfilled the requirements of the order of 
the court by paying the designated debts of the parties as they 
became due during the course of the proceedings. No tax debt 
existed during this time, and thus he did all he was required to do. 
No monthly impound was made for tax and insurance purposes 
during the course of the year, with no tax liability arising for 
the home until noon on November 30th, 19 88, when the real property 
taxes became due. 59-2-1325, U.C.A. (1953 as amended), provides 
in part as follows: 
"All taxes, unless otherwise specifically provided for under 
Sec. 59-2-1326, or other law, unpaid at noon on November 
30 of each year following the date of levy, are delinquent, 
and the county treasurer shall close his office for the 
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receipt of taxes until a delinquent list for publication has 
been prepared. If November 30 falls on a Sunday or other 
legal holiday, taxes become delinquent at noon on the day 
following the Sunday or legal holiday." 
The Decree of Divorce was entered on October 28, 1988. 
(R.776) The taxes were due by November 30th. The appellant did 
pay during the pendency of the proceedings, prior to the entry of 
the Decree, all obligations on the mortgage connected with the 
home. Therefore the appellant did comply fully with the court's 
order as to the debts on the home which he was required to pay. 
The fact that a tax debt accrues and becomes due after the divorce, 
covering taxes for a period of time prior to the divorce, does not 
mean that appellant did not comply fully with the court's order. 
Since there was no tax liability during the course of the proceeding£ 
he could not have been held in contempt for failing to pay taxes 
during that time. Therefore, how can he be required to pay for 
a debt after his obligation to pay for such a debt has ceased? 
It is abundantly obvious that it was the court's intent 
in the initial proceedings covering the payment of the debts on 
the home, that appellant, Mr. Early, pay certain debts during the 
pendency of the divorce proceedings in order to protect and support 
his family. The court intended that as part of that support he 
pay certain debts on the home as they accrued in order to ease 
the burdens upon the family. There were no monthly payments 
towards taxes. There were monthly payments on th€> mortgage, which 
he paid. The court did not intend that he pay debts that were 
not owing. The tax debt was not owing until after the divorce. 
At that time the tax obligation became the sole responsibility of 
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Mrs. Early. We therefore submit that it was error for the court 
to order Mr. Early to pay for a debt that did not exist during 
the pendency of the proceedings. The tax debt did not exist until 
after the entry of the Decree, at a time when the parties were 
governed by the Decree of Divorce. The parties and the court were 
no longer governed by prior orders that had been intended to deal 
with matters on a temporary basis only. 
Next, we draw the court's attention to the Mutual Release 
signed by the parties and dated October 26, 1988. The terms of 
this release are broad and all encompassing. The pertinent parts 
are as follows: 
Page 1 (R.802) 
"Now, therefore, in consideration of the premies aforesaid, 
and subject to the faithful performance of the requirements 
of said judgment and decree based upon such Stipulation, 
the said parties, and each of them, do hereby release and 
forever discharge the other of, from, and against any and all 
claims,demands, causes of action, obligations, damages, and 
liabilities of any nature whatsoever, whether known or 
unknown, suspected or claimed, which they, and each of them, 
ever had, now have, or may hereafter have or claim to have 
against the other, whether known or unknown, including spe-
cifically, but not exclusively, and without limiting the 
generality of the foregoing, any and all claims and causes 
of action, based on, or in any manner arising out of the 
marriage relationship of the parties, or any other relation-
ship, existing prior hereto, or in any manner connected 
therewith. * * * * [P. 3, R.804] The parties shall, and 
do, hereby mutually temise, release, and forever discharge 
each other, the attorney's, accountant, appraisers, and all 
other professionals employed in this divorce action from 
any and all actions, suits, debts, claims, demands, and 
obligations whatsoever, whether based upon law, equity, or 
fraud, which either of them has ever had, now has, or may 
hereafter have, against any of the others, upon or by reason 
of any matter, cause, or thing up to the date of the 
execution of the Stipulation for divorce settlement and the 
execution of this Mutual Release, including, but not limited 
to, omissions, comissions, breach of contract, tort, negligent 
misrepresentation, fraudulent representation, breach of 
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trust or fiduciary duty, or any other matter founded upon 
equitable relief. * * * * [P.4, R.805] It is the intention 
of the parties that hence forth there shall be as between 
them only such explicit rights and obligations as are 
specifically provided in the Stipulation and Property 
Settlement Agreement hereinabove identified and the judgment 
which issues pursuant thereto." 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this release. The first, 
and the one most favorable to the respondent, is that the release 
releases all claims between the parties. So, Mrs. Early would 
have no claim against Mr. Early for taxes and Mr. Early would have 
no claim against her for amounts he claims due him after the parties 
separated. In Mrs. Early's responsive memorandum below (R.916) she 
states that Mr. Early's claim that he was obligated only to make 
the payments necessary to protect the property during the pendency 
of the proceedings was "farcical." However, the real argument that 
is farcical is that they claim moneis due in the face of a very 
general and broad release. 
Mrs. Early argued below (R. 915-916) that the Stipulation 
between the parties required Mr. Early to pay the taxes on the 
home. The Stipulation doesn't provide that at all, and the Mutual 
Release would clearly seem to indicate that both parties have 
performed fully those obligations required of them. 
The second interpretation is that the Mutual Release 
absolves Mr. Early of any claim on the taxes, but does not absolve 
Mrs. Early of the offsets claimed because the Release provides 
that the parties will continue to be bound only to do those things 
they are obligated to do in the Stipulation, and the Stipulation doe; 
- 1 3 -
not provide that he pay any taxes, but only provides that Mrs. 
Early pay debts incurred by her after the separation date. We 
assert that this interpretation is the correct one. Even if we 
assume for argument's sake that he owed taxes from a prior order, 
it is clear that the Release releases him from all prior obligations 
under any orders prior to the final Decree and obligates him only 
to do those things set forth in the Stipulation and the resulting 
Decree of Divorce. It simply does not require that he perform 
acts under prior court orders. The prior orders were to govern 
matters until the Decree was entered, and the Decree was intended 
to supplant the prior orders. This is all hypothetical only 
since it is our position that the prior order in any event did 
not require Mr. Early to pay any taxes if no tax debt existed 
during the pendency of the proceedings. 
Mrs. Early below argued that the release protects her, but 
not Mr. Early. (R.915) This makes no sense. Since the Release 
specifically provides on page 4 (R.805) that the parties will 
be bound to do only those things set forth in the Stipulation and 
subsequent Decree, Mr. Early has no obligation to pay taxes because 
nothing about a tax obligation for the residence is mentioned 
in either document. On the other hand it is mentioned in the 
Decree that Mrs. Early will pay for debts incurred by her after 
the date of separation. 
Accordingly, we submit that the court erred below in 
ignoring the clear language of the Release and Stipulation, and 
ordering Mr. Early to pay a tax obligation that did not exist 
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until after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
POINT II: 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD APPELLANT A JUDGMENT 
AND OFFSET FOR AMOUNTS CLAIMED DUE FROM RESPONDENT 
In appellant's Affidavit (R.909) he admits that there are 
some monies owing to Mrs. Early from the last month prior to the 
entry of the Decree. However, he also specifies in his affidavit 
various bills that he had been required to pay that had been 
incurred by Mrs. Early after the date of separation. The Decree 
of Divorce (R.782) and the Stipulation (R.887) both clearly provide 
that Mrs. Early will pay for debts incurred after the date of 
separation. The debts claimed by Mr. Early were incurred after 
the date of separation, and this fact, together with the fact 
that the amounts were paid by Mr. Early, were unrefuted. This 
being the case there can be no defense to Mr. Early's claims. 
The only argument the respondent advanced below was that 
the Mutual Release absolved her of any responsibility. She takes 
the odd position that the Stipulation and Release both " . . . were 
designed with the intent of releasing Plaintiff from all claims 
or expenses incurred subsequent to the separation and preserving 
only Plaintiff's claims . . . ." (R.917) Perhaps Mrs. Early 
didn't read the Release carefully. It states that it is a "Mutual 
Release". It does not state that it is a release of Mrs. Early 
alone. It is highly falacious to argue that it was intended to 
release her from Mr. Early's claims, yet not release him from hers. 
This is not a unilateral agreement or release, and there is absolute] 
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nothing in the record to indicate that there was ever any intent 
by the parties to provide such unilateral relief to Mrs. Early alone 
Furthermore, the language on page 4 of that Release clearly 
provides that the parties are to be bound by the obligations in 
the Stipulation and accompanying Decree. That Decree (R.782) 
provides that Mrs. Early is to pay the debts incurred by her after 
the date of separation. Mrs. Early claims the best of both worlds— 
no obligations on her part to Mr. Early, but he owing her everything 
This is clearly contrary to the wording of the documents, as well 
as the intent of the parties. 
We therefore submit that Mr. Early was entitled to recover 
a judgment against Mrs. Early for the amounts claimed due by him 
in his affidavit. The Mutual Release does absolve him of any 
possible tax obligation, if one ever existed. 
POINT III: 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ISSUE A WRITTEN STATEMENT 
SETTING FORTH THE GROUNDS AND REASONS FOR ITS DECISION 
Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., provides in part as follows: 
"The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as 
provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue 
a brief written statement of the ground for its decision 
on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 
56 . . . ." 
The appellant filed an objection to the court's ruling and 
requested that the court either make and enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law (r.935), or in the alternative, that the court 
make and issue some brief explanation setting forth the grounds 
and rationale for its decision. (R.936) This the court refused to d< 
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(R.940) While we concede that the court is not required to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in a ruling on a summary 
judgment motion, the court was obligated to issue a written 
statement of the grounds for its ruling. The decision handed 
down by the court (R.925) fails to do this. Thus, the appellant 
is left with absolutely no idea as to why the court has ruled 
as it has, thus placing everyone involved in the dark as to the 
rationale for the court's decision. 
Furthermore, the court has avoided its responsibility to 
justify to the parties the basis for its ruling. The court should 
be required to set forth in a statement the grounds and reasons 
for its decision not only for the reason of adequately informing 
the parties as to the basis for the ruling, but to maintain 
adequate accountability of the court. We therefore submit that 
the court was in error in refusing to submit a brief written 
statement setting forth the reasons for its ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that Mr. Early should not have had a judgment 
entered against him for the taxes on the residential property 
for the reasons that (a) the debt never existed during the pendency 
of the proceedings and was not due until after the Decree of Divorce 
was entered, and (b) the Mutual Release released him from any 
possible tax obligation, and obligated him only to those things 
set forth in the Decree of Divorce. That Decree provides for no 
requirement that he pay taxes on the residence. Accordingly, 
the judgment for this amount should be reversed. 
-17-
Mr. Early is entitled to an offset against the amounts 
he admits owing Mrs. Early, and a judgment against her for the 
balance of the monies he paid on debts incurred by her which 
are her responsibility under the Decree and Stipulation. 
The Mutual Release clearly does not provide that she be absolved 
of this responsibility of reimbursement becasue the Release on 
page 4 clearly provides that the parties are required to carry 
out the obligations incumbent upon them under the terms of the 
Stipulation and resulting Decree. That Decree requires her to 
pay these debts. 
The court also erred in refusing to provide a written 
statement setting forth the grounds for its ruling. This places 
the appellant at a disadvantage in attempting to respond to the 
actions of the court and reduces the accountability of the court. 
We therefore request that the judgment against Mr. Early 
be reversed, and that a judgment against Mrs. Early for the 
amounts due Mr. Early, after appropriate offsets, be granted in 
favor of Mr. Early. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
BRANT H. WALL 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
-18-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that four copies of the appellant's 
foregoing Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Richard D. 
Burbidge, attorney for respondent/plaintiff, 139 East South 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
MINUTE ENTRY 
M 2 4 m? 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, °TATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN EARLY, : BftearSifOtf / 
Plaintiff, : CIVIL NO. D-86-4771 
. vs. : 
DAVID WARREN EARLY, 
Defendant. : 
The Commissioner's Order is approved in its entirety, other 
than as it is in conflict with the following. 
Defendant is ordered to pay the utility bills on the home of 
the parties. 
All major repairs on the residence will be paid as agreed by 
the parties, and in the event they cannot agree, as determined by 
the Court or Commissioner upon application. 
The defendant will cause Dapor, Inc., or will personally 
advance to plaintiff, the sum of $5,000.00 per month for six 
consecutive months, and those funds shall be used by plaintiff 
exclusively for tine purpose of her attorneys, accounting, 
auditing and other necessary fees for the prosecution of the 
instant action. They shall not be used for any other purpose 
without permission of the Court. Said account will be set up as 
a loan account from the corporation/- or from the defendant to the 
plaintiff as the case may be, with final determination of the 
EARLY V PA1 tY PAGE TWO DECISION 
obligation to repay to be made at the time of final disposition 
of this action 
Q.e^endcin.ts lis teUTcsfelJfeo? o l d e n e d and r e s t r a i n e d from i n any 
member? a l t e r i n g *Efi£ a c c o u n t i n g p r a c t i c e s of" t h e b u s i n e s s e s , o r 
B?M3£ <mSrin~eTt<> on msitKegS o'fi p a ^ ' e h J S o:f a'ccojunts*} o r t h e manner o r 
mg,i5hud o^ fl rei^ei\YdJin:g a c c o u n t s rrecei!vvab]5e s o t h a t i t w i l l become 
f t 
<tf<me d^frfil'QU^fe t o defeeosmine s a s h fl'ow.s^ and e x p e n s e s and income 
£ G » Shre dompany b^SWfre'ff^eis aarrd t h e i 'hUlvl%u:a is . 
SpreAi-f^fcalhbY :#n rveUtafJ&on t o \tn*e r e n t a l income r e c e i v e d f o r 
'$*&& gMo^enstgdie^' ojff tare ^aj^ta^es^ -fche d e f e n d a n t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y 
:efi#&€<ned a_Qd tiSSi&ixa^iJn'ed fieom aUMte-jsing* t i re amounts of p a y m e n t s 
Ifeajfirg jfias&g f a s e'a.Qb SAP^entey, and fesptt a l ^ r i n g , o r a t t e n d i n g , o r 
8g3$R$3&^ %$& 2&03&B4 yLZLWfmezifcs< a*& Hhes ;end> -ojfi thre y e a * f-a»om t h e 
aitBSya^ ^ ° ^ sarfSi ^rroper ; t$e 's a*s s'e£ fo r . th f o r t h e y e a r 19 8 6 
SflaSSftouS W e spjaj£Sd^*3 apgroViafl/. ojff t h e ' C o u r t , 
In t h e e v e n t any d i f f i c u l t y i s e n c o u n t e r e d in t h i s r e g a r d , 
t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s Mo t ion f o r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of a r e c e i v e r may be 
r e f i l e d b e f o r e t h e C o u r t . 
Dated t h i s _ d a y of J u n e , 1987 . 
RICHARD II. MOFFAT V V 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ADDENDUM "C" 
STIPULATION AND PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
BRANT H. WALL, NO. 3 36 4 
ij/ALL & WALL, a.p.c. 
Attorney for Defendant 
$uite 800 Boston Building 
jSa.lt Lake City, Utah 84111 
[telephone: (801) 521-8220 
i! IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
n 
!$USAN H. EARLY, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
I ; 
I I 
i i 
ii Vi 
jOAVID W. EARLY, 
ii 
1
 Defendant, 
STIPULATION AND PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Civil No. D86-4771 
HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
*AU A A-Acl (A PC ) I j 
^ r ' ^ N t Y S A ! LAW ; I 
£ K O fiOifO. B'JiV.OtNG ' ; 
. • i.*Af r.ir>t j i 041 j i !! 
i! COME NOW the parties to the above entitled 
I j 
individually, and by their resoective counsel of record, and 
ii 
S t i p u l a t e and agree t h a t in t h e even t t h e above e n t i t l e d Court 
Iqrants a d e c r e e of d i v o r c e in t h i s c a u s e , the fol low in? terms and 
.condi t ions s h a l l be i n c o r p o r a t e d ' the re in and made a p a r t of sa id 
j , 
'judgment and decree: 
;; 1. The Defendant, David Early, shall pay to the Plaintiff, 
jfiusan Marly, subject, however, to the conditions, 1 imitations, £;:d 
jprovi.siori£ hereinafter set forth in this Paragraph,, the sum of. 
($1,250,000 as follows: 
•j A) $1,000,000 in cash upon receipt of some by v.hf: 
;j Defendant via the procurement of mortgage loan proceeds in 
11
 such amount which in any event shall be paid to and madf; 
'j available to the Plaintiff within a period of not more thnn 
-2-
!Mlli I 
5 days from and after the execution of this Stipulation. 
Be it provided, however, that in the event such funds are 
unavailable to the Defendant from such source or sources, 
then, and in that event, this Agreement and Stipulation 
shall be considered null and void and of no further force 
and effect. 
B) $250,000 shall be paid to the Plaintiff by the 
Defendant in the form of a Promissory Note, in the form of 
Exhibit "A" hereto, bearing interest at a rate of 10% per 
annum. Such Note to be amortized and in equal monthly 
installments for a period of five (5) years, and secured by 
a First Deed of Trust, in the form of Exhibit. "B" hereto, 
on certain real property generally identified as David' 
Early Tire Store # 2, located at approximately 253 West 
9000 South, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Said Note and 
Deed of Trust shall be executed and delivered concurrent 
with the payment of the $1,000,000, aforesaid. 
2. The division and allocation of properties between the 
p^arties as herein provided, including all properties, real, 
i 
' p e r sona l , or mixed, s h a l l be made, deemed, and c o n s i d e r e d to be 
I* 
"tax neutral", i.e. any payment by David Early to Susan Early 
lundor this provision is designated as not includible in the gro^u 
iincomo Ql Susan Early under Section 71(b)(1)(B) and nor allov/able 
ao a deduction to David Early under Section 215 of the Internal 
Revcp.ae Code of 1986, -> ; amended. The parties agree to treat tho 
payment for Federal income tax purposes consistently with this 
d e s i q - \ <-t t i o n . 
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3. The Plaintiff, Susan Early, may be awarded as her 
sole and separate real property, the real property identified as 
the "family residence" located at 4061 South Powers Circle, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, tree of any lien or claim. In addition 
thereto, the Plaintiff shall receive as her sole and separate 
property all of the furniture, furnishings and other personal 
property, including Plaintiff's jewelry, personal effects, 
clothing, and cash accounts, presently located within said 
"family residence", with the exception that Defendant shall 
receive the following items as his sole and separate property: 
A) Two oriental rugs identifiable oy the parties. 
B) One bronze Indian statue. 
Ao a condition to Defendant taking possession of ihr* said 
starue, he shall replace same with a statue represented by 
Margaret Amberson in writing to be a reasonable replacement. 
4. The Plaintiff shalJ be awarded the Audi automobile 
presently in her possession, free of any liens or. encumbrance:,, 
including repair bills previously presented by or to David Errly 
Tires, Inc. 
5. The custody of the two minor children which have been 
born as issue of this marriage, namely: DAVID, JR., and PORTIA, 
is awarded to the Plaintiff, subject, however, no liberal eights 
of visitation by the Defendant. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties further 
stipulate that in th>2 event the Plaintiff moves from the S* at* 
-4-
support and maintenance of the minor children of the pai. 
of Utah during the time that the minor child, David, J&. , is *. if 
at v. e iid-i."fig—l^ -e4r-l-a-m^ —H-?rl-l— s-c-hxrolr;—tii-e--c-u-s-bady--of •—sueh- mi no 5/^ ch i 1 d ^ ^ 
shall be awarded to the Defendant dha-E4Hfr§---s-tfre-h school periods, QJ 
<p-r-ov-i-d-ed s ai-d—-m-inor- oh-i-4-d—d^-gireo to refna-i-n on-fuelled in ouch-
•insti tirtioTT -and-remains--in the- S^-t-e--of--H-ba+h. 
6. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff for the . 
;rties thgf 
sum of $500 per child per monthAuntil such child attains his or 
her respective majority. In addition thereto, the Defendant 
shall pay the private school expenses, including tuition, books, 
and other fees as may be incurred by the minor child, David 
Early, Jr., while attending RolLand Hall. Also, the Defendant 
agrees to pay all college expenses of said children, including 
tuition, books, and living expenses, including housing, food, 
clothing, transportation, etc., so long as said child or 
children reside away from the family home during such college 
education, and provided, further, that such child or children 
are fully matriculated and upon the further limitation and 
condition that such additional expenses shall be made available 
to provide for the procurement of a bachelor's degree or its 
equivalent based upon full time matriculation in any such 
college. 
7. The Defendant is entitled to claim the dependency 
exemptions for the minor children of the parties whenever either-
party is entitled to claim the dependency exemptions under 
Section 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
c££ 
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amended. Plaintiff agrees to sign and provide to Defendant a 
declaration required by the Internal Revenue Service to 
implement such claim. 
8. The Defendant agrees to pay all medical and dental 
expenses of the minor children of the parties until each attains 
their respective majority and thereafter, so long as any such 
child or children are fully matriculated in college in 
accordance with the provisions set forth hreinabove. 
9. Defendant shall maintain a policy of health insurance 
for the benefit of the Plaintiff consistent wi'th that which has 
been previously in effect so long as such insurance is available 
to the Defendant through his business or employment. A copy of 
sucn policy shall be immediately provided to Plaintiff. 
10. With the exception of those assets and monies 
referred to hereinabove, the Defendant shall be awarded as his 
sole and separate properties, free and clear of any lien or 
claim on the part of the Plaintiff, each and every other atset 
owned, acquired, or which either of the parties claim any right, 
title or interest therein, whether real, personal/ mixed, 
tangible, or intangible, including, but not limited to, the 
following: 
A) All stock in and to David Early Ties, Inc., issued 
or otherwise, Galeria Des Expositions, Quail Creek 
Vineyard, their successors or predecessors, in the name 
of the Plaintiff and/or Defendant, or which Plaintiff may 
claim any right, title or interest therein. 
-5a-
B) The Defendant shall have and retain as his sole, 
individual and sepatate property all of the interests in 
certain businesses known as David Early Tires, Inc., 
Galerie Des Expositions, and Quail Creek Vineyard, said 
businesses are operated by David W. Early, including 
stock and other choses in action, free of any claim or 
interest of Plaintiff and Plaintiff agrees to execute any 
and all necessary documents and instruments, including 
endorsement and delivery of stock, if any, to effect the 
intent and purpose of this clause. Defendant agrees to 
indemnify and save Plaintiff harmless on any and all 
obligations, claims, and demands against her as a result 
of past, present, or future operation of such businesses. 
C) Each and every parcel of real property, 
wheresoever an whatsoever, owned by the Plaintiff and/or 
Eefendant, or either of them, and in this regard, the 
said Plaintiff 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx y'£s 
L WAV | (A P C } 
£ '-in u r ^ u i 
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shall execute and deliver to the Defendant such deeds of 
conveyance as may be necessary or appropriate to convey and 
relinquish all of her right, title, or interest therein in 
favor of the said Defendant. The said Plaintiff 
specifically represents that she has not executed any 
assignment, conveyance, hypothecation, lien, or other 
encumbrance against any such parcel or parcels of real 
property, except those liens executed by Plaintiff and 
Defendant jointly. 
D) All assets or interests in any and all partnership 
or partnerships, corporations, patents, trade names, 
licenses, stock, and choses in action ot* any kind, nature 
or description, whatsoever owned by the parties, or either 
of them, as of the date of tnis Stipulation. 
E) All persona] property and possessions now in his 
j possession. 
J 11. The Defendant shall assume and pay all debts and 
pbligations attendant to or arising from the assets which he is 
i 
awarded and are distributed to him, and further indemnify and 
protect the Plaintiff against any debts and obligations of t:\e 
business identified as "David Early Tires, Inc.", its retail stcre 
i ' 
[[Locations, a l l t a x l i a b i l i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g s t a t e and f e d e r a l income 
ji 
Jtax liabilities of the parties prior to the date of the execntic-
,l 
'of this Stioulation. Be it provided, however, that with respect :.c 
I! 
j'any federal, state, or local income tax liabilities arising ^ C I I 
! 
jthe income of Susan Early which has not be disclosed to t.>e 
iDefendant shall be and remain her sole and separate liaoilicy a* : 
/O 
• 7 -
LIAPC) 
M LAW 
>N HUH. C*NG 
Li * *i » M 
paid Plaintiff shall indemnify and protect the Defendant against 
pny such Liabilities 
12i)y The Plaintiff agrees to assume and pay the separate 
jclebts and obligations which she has incurred subsequent to the 
Reparation of the parties, excepting those which, by Order of the 
Court, Defendant is obligated to pay, and agrees to indemnify and 
lold the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
13. The parties have filed, or will file, joint federal 
knd state income tax returns for the year 1987 and prior thereto. 
jtfith respect to these joint returns, David Early has the sole 
i 
! 
Responsibility for any deficiency or assessment and has the sole 
i 
right to any refund, carryforward, or carryback. David Early may 
take any actions he deems necessary to prosecute any refund or 
i 
i&efend any deficiency or assessment and will solelv Day all costs p 
[incurred. Susan Early waives any right to refunds and will 
l 
•cooperate fully and promptly in these matters, including executing 
: i 
\\\ power of attorney and any other necessary instruments providing 
if 
linformation and testimony and endorsing any refund checks or 
ii 
i| 
jyouchers. 
14. Each of the parties waives and relinquishes any and 
jail right or claim to alimony, effective upon the payment of the 
consideration due hereunder. 
15. Certain monies have been advanced by the Defendant for 
the account of the Plaintiff to defray certain costs of litigation, 
including attorney's fees, appraisal fees, and accountant's fees. 
i ! 
;ln this regard, the Plaintiff shall have no obligation to account 
ji 
If or or repay any such funds. Each party shall be responsible i'or their respective costs and attorney's fees incurred horolflfT c^ -^? 
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16. Until such time as this Stipulation is executed and 
judgment entered thereon, the parties agree to abide by the 
prior Orders of this Court, 
17. Concurrent with the execution of the final Decree 
and Judgment herein, the parties agree to execute mutual 
releases between one another in the form attached hereto 
entitled "Mutual Release" and by reference incorporated herein \ 
and made a part hereof, ax ^ . J e-nf* A f<v 75 f y t u b ' t C W 
18. The parties agree that a Decree of Divorce may be 
awarded to each party in accordance with the terms hereof on the 
grounds oi irreconcilable differences. 
DATiiD this _[<Z_ day of October, 1988. 
.BRANT H . WALL 
Attorney for Defendant 
ADDENDUM "D" 
MUTUAL RELEASE; 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
11 EXHIBIT "CM 
! I 
\ 
I 
; MUTUAL RELEASE 
i ' 
! 
This INDENTURE made and executed this day on 
:i . 
y; •- vyrv , 1988, by and between SUSAN EARLY and DAVID EARLY. 
l| 
i I 
j1 W I T N E S S E T H ; I 
li J 
| WHEREAS, the said parties have been involved in a contested 
|l j 
hdivorce action in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State ofi 
!iUtah, identified as Civil Action No. D86-4771; and, 
j! WHEREAS, said parties have, by Stipulation dated the 13tn 
!i j.day of October, 1988, resolved all of their disputes and claims J 
i 
| and the same has been or is about to be adjudicated or will be 
resolved by formal decree of said Court. 
I NOW, THEREFORE, IN CONSIDERATION of the premises aforesaid; 
it 
I
 and subject to the faithful performance of the requirements of said 
II
 judgment and decree based upon such Stipulation, the said parties J 
I and each of them, do hereby release and forever discharge the other 
!' J 
i of, from, and against any and all claims, demands, causes ofi 
action, obligations, damages, and liabilities of any nature 
whatsoever, whether known or unknown, suspected or claimed, which 
'they, and each of them, ever had, now have, or may hereafter hav£ 
or claim to have against the other, whether known or unknownj 
including specifically, but not exclusively, and without limitin 
« the generality of the foregoing, any and all claims and causes o 
action, based on, or in any manner arising out of the marriage 
relationship of the parties, or any other relationship, existing 
prior hereto, or in any manner connected therewith. 
<LL 4 WALL ( A P C ) • J nORNEYS AT LAW tOO BOSTON BCHLOtNG I AK£ O Y UT 8 4 U 1 ,
!j 
II - 2 " 
In the negotiation, preparation, and execution of this 
Release agreement, the parties acknowledge that each has been 
independently represented by counsel, accountants, and other 
professionals in the examination of the marital property of the 
parties and all other assets owned, claimed, or jointly oif 
severally owned or held by said parties. 
The parties have relied upon the independent counsel J 
i ' 
ljvaluation, and appraisals conducted by the professionals to guide 
! 
j[the parties in determining the values of the properties and assets] 
i 
t and the division thereof. 
i. Both the legal and practical effect of this agreement ixk 
I 
Meach and every respect and the financial status of the parties has 
i J 
been fully explained to both parties by their respective counsel 
and they both acknowledge that it is a fair agreement and is not 
the result of any fraud, duress, or undue influence exercised by 
(I either party upon the other or by any other person or persons upom 
I, either, and they further agree that this agreement contains thi 
|l entire understanding of the parties. There are no representations! 
i I 
i| promises, warranties, covenants, or undertakings other than thosi 
hexpressly set forth therein. It is mutually understood that this 
I agreement is entered into only after considerable negotiation ancjl 
''as a result of much thought and deliberation by and on behalf o 
1
 each of the parties hereto and with the distinct understanding that 
it shall be construed as a final settlement between the parties of 
all property, alimony, or other financial rights arising out of thi 
marital contract or otherwise; and is entered into voluntarily by 
( A P C ) 
T LAW f\ 
IBUILCXNG ] [Vj / 
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both parties upon the advice of their respective attorneys afte 
open opportunity to examine and appraise full by both Plaintiff an£ 
Defendant as to all property and property rights, owned 
controlled, or possessed by them; and, after mature deliberatioh 
!i and having in mind the financial status of each of the parties 
I 
lihereto and all property owned, controlled, or possessed by them an£ 
|l 
'ieach of them, the foregoing is declared to be a fair, equitable, an£ 
I just settlement. It is understood by Plaintiff and Defendant tha 
] the facts in respect of which this agreement is made may hereaftet 
» prove to be other than or different from the facts now known by 
I either of them or believed by either of them to be true, as se 
i| out in this agreement. Each of the parties expressly accepts an{I 
j' assumes the risk of the facts proving to be so different, and each 
of the parties agrees that all the terms of this agreement shall bfe 
in all respects effective and not subject to termination o): 
I recission by any such difference in facts. 
j' The parties shall, and do, hereby mutually remise, release 
II and forever discharge each other, the attorney's, accountants 
appraisers, and all other professionals employed in this divorc 
action from any and all actions, suits, debts, claims, demands, an{i 
; obligations whatsoever, whether based upon law, equity, or fraud 
'which either of them has ever had, now has, or may hereafter have 
against any of the others, upon or by reason of any matter, cause 
, or thing up to the date of the execution of the Stipulation fo|r 
divorce settlement and the execution of this Mutual Release 
h including, but not limited to, omissions, comissions, breach o|£ L 4 WALL (A PC) I ORNEYS AT LAW ' , 
» BOSTON BUILDING | j 
AKECITY UT 04111 
aoi) S210220 i ' "s^/^/y \%z. 
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j contract, tort, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent 
! 
, representation, breach of trust or fiduciary duty, or any other 
,;matter founded upon equitable relief. The Plaintiff and Defendant 
i I 
• specifically recognize that the Defendant, David W. Early, may 
1
 elect to expand, lease, sell, or otherwise alter or change thA 
,'nature of the operation, ownership, or corporate structure of David 
• Early Tires, Inc w and that the Plaintiff specifically releases and 
I discharges said Defendant from any and all causes of action or 
l other claims which may exist or hereafter exist by reason of any 
!. 1 
!lsuch matters. It is the intention of the parties that hence forth 
»1 I 
there shall be as between them only such explicit rights and 
obligations as are specifically provided in the Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement hereinabove identified and th$ 
judgment which issues pursuant thereto. 
Further, Plaintiff, David Early Tires, Inc., and al 
predecessors of same, their legal representatives, professionals 
successors, and assignees mutually release and discharge on4 
another from any and all claims, demands, actions, or suits at law 1
 L 
j or in equity of any kind or nature, in any manner arising out of 
,all prior relationships, the divorce negotiations, litigation, anp 
,i 
j;matters referred to in the Stipulation for settlement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed thei 
respective signatures the day and year first hereinabove written. 
STTSAN EARLY ~^*^ "7 
L ( A P C ) 
AT LAW 
ON BUILDING 
Y UT 84111 | 
•220 I 
DAVID^BARLY 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., #0492 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq., #2278 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
139 East South Temple, #2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN EARLY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID WARREN EARLY, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. D86-04771 
Richard H. Moffat, Judge 
The above entitled matter, having come on for trial 
August 8, 9, 10 and 11, 1988, before the Honorable Richard H. 
Moffat, Judge of the above-entitled court, and having come 
before the Court for hearing on October 20, 1988, Plaintiff 
appearing m person and by and through her attorney of record, 
Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell, and Defendant 
appearing in person and by and through his counsel of record, 
Brant H. Wall of Wall & Wall, and the Court having received the 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement entered into 
between the parties, and being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant have been residing in Salt 
Lake county, State of Utah, for three months immediately prior 
to the filing of this action. 
2. The parties are husband and wife, having been married 
to one another on January 28, 1967, in Burley, Idaho. 
3. The parties have two children as issue of this 
marriage, to wit: Portia Allison Early, born June 29, 1971, and 
David Dan Early, born March 31, 1974. 
4. The parties have encountered irreconcilable 
differences in their marriage which has caused them to determine 
to divorce one another, based upon said irreconcilable 
differences within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated, Section 
30-3-1. 
5. The parties have entered into a Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement dated October 13, 1988, which sets 
forth the complete and appropriate division and distribution of 
their properties, both real and personal, the appropriate 
support obligations as between the parties and as respects their 
$y\<L Mutual Q*U?1>/ 
children. The Stipulation and Property Settlement AgreementAis 
herein incorporated into the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and attached hereto as Exhibit* A".J-VA.d ^ythiptT Q 
6. Said Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement 
should be approved, should bind the parties and should determine 
the division and distribution of the parties1 property, both 
real and personal, and the appropriate support obligations as 
between the parties, and the care and support of the children of 
the parties. 
7. The custody of the two minor children, namely: 
Portia Allison and David Dan, is awarded to the Plaintiff, in 
accordance with and subject to the terms of the Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement dated October 13, 1988. 
8. The parties agree that upon entry of the Decree of 
Divorce; the file in the above-referenced matter shall be sealed 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-4. 
9. From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
That the Plaintiff and Defendant are entitled to a Decree 
of Divorce against one another dissolving the bonds of matrimony 
heretofore existing, the same to be final upon entry thereof, 
and the same to further provide for the distribution of the real 
and personal property of the parties and the support obligations 
as between them and as respects the children of the parties as 
set forth in the Findings of Facts heretofore answered herein. 
Further, the file in this matter shall be sealed in 
accordance with Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-4. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Judgment be entered 
accordingly. 
DATED this day of October, 1988. 
BY THE COURT 
By 
RICHARD H. MOFFAT, Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARD^r^TRBlSSE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
WALL & WALL 
"By Vj>-*-*.£# 
BRAjtfT H . WALL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
L^^V /^ 
d d 0 2 0 8 a 
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq-, #0492 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq., #2278 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
139 East South Temple, #2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN EARLY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DAVID WARREN EARLY, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D86-04771 
RICHARD H. MOFFAT, Judge 
The above-entitled matter, having come on for trial on 
August 8, 9, 10 and 11, 1988, before the Honorable Richard H. 
Moffat, Judge of the above-entitled court, and having come 
before the Court for hearing on October 20, 1988, Plaintiff 
appearing in person and by and through her attorney of record, 
Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell, and Defendant 
appearing in person and by and through his counsel of record, 
Brant H. Wall of Wall and Wall, and the Court having received a 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement previously 
executed by Plaintiff and Defendant and their counsel of record, 
and after being fully advised in the premises, and having made 
<:>-' ^nt-f>-ed into its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED as follows, to wit: 
1. That Plaintiff Susan Early and Defendant David Warren 
Early be, and hereby are, awarded a divorce from one another 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between 
the parties, the same to be final upon signing and entry hereof. 
2. The Defendant, David W. Early, shall pay to the 
Plaintiff, Susan Early, the sum of $1,250,000.00 as follows: 
a. $1,000,000.00 in cash upon entry of this Decree; 
and 
b. $250,000.00 shall be paid to the Plaintiff by 
the Defendant in the form of a promissory note, the form 
of said promissory note is attached as Exhibit "A11 to the 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, bearing 
interest at a rate of 10% per annum, such note to be 
amortized and in equal monthly installments for a period 
of five (5) years, and secured by a first deed of trust, 
in the form of Exhibit "B" to the Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement, on certain real property 
generally identified as David Early Tire Store, No. 2, 
located at approximately 253 West 9000 South, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Said note and deed of trust shall 
be executed and delivered concurrent with the payment of 
the $1,000,000.00 afo:esaid. 
3. The division and allocation of the properties between 
the parties as herein provided, including all properties, real, 
personal or mixed, shall be made, deemed and considered to be 
"tax neutral", i.e., any payment by David Early to Susan Early 
under this provision is designated as not includeable in the 
gross income of Susan Early under Section 71(b)(1)(B) and not 
-2-
allowable as a deduction to David Early under Section 215 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. The parties agree to 
treat the payment for Federal Income Tax purposes consistently 
with this designation. 
4. The Plaintiff, Susan Early, shall be awarded as her 
sole and separate real property, the real property identified as 
the "family residence" located at 4061 South Powers Circle, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, free of any lien or claim. In addition 
thereto, the Plaintiff shall receive as her sole and separate 
property, all of the furniture, furnishings and other personal 
property, including Plaintiff's jewelry, personal effects, 
clothing and cash accounts, presently located within said 
"family residence", with the exception that Defendant shall 
receive the following items as his sole and separate property: 
a. two oriental rugs identifiable by the parties; 
and 
b. one bronze Indian statute. As a condition to 
Defendant taking possession of the said statute, he shall 
replace same with a statute by Ursula Broadaf Craig, 
similar to such statutes offered for sale at Galeria des 
Expositions. 
5. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the Audi automobile 
presently in her possession, free of any liens or encumbrances, 
including repair bills previously presented by or to David Early 
Tires, Inc. 
6. The parties have two children as issue of this 
marriage, to wit: Portia Allison, born June 29, 1971, and David 
Dan Early, born March 31, 1974. The custody of the said two 
minor children is awarded to the Plaintiff, subject however, to 
liberal rights of visitation by the Defendant. In the event th 
Plaintiff moves from the state of Utah during the time that the 
*c- ,,-fche I minor cnild, David Dan is a^t^H^4-ft^~Raw4^-n4-^^l-i^re-h^ei 
r^ 4j^ r^O-dy—o-f—si^ eh- minor./\child shall be awarded to the Defendant* L 
rlale- of **^~^ 
-dtH?-artTcr~strch—s-ch-Q^ -^-^ et4^ -^r^ pr-ov±^ ed---s-^ -l"d mintu clrild deoirco to 
j^ ewa-i-n enir-ei-lad —in —su<2-h- i-ns-t-it-u-t-ton—s.n-d—r-eflva-i-n-3 in Llie & 
•tHr«rtr. 
7. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff for the 
support and maintenance of the minor children of the parties the
 T 
sum of $500.00 per child per montfy\until such child attains his 
or her respective majority. In addition thereto, the Defendant 
shall pay the private school expenses, including tuition, books, 
and other fees as may be incurred by the minor child, David Dan, 
while attending Rowland Hall. The Defendant shall further pay 
all college expenses of said children, including tuition, books 
and living expenses, 'including housing, food, clothing, 
transportation, etc., so long as said child or children reside 
away from the family home during such college education, and 
provided, further, that such child or children are fully 
matriculated and upon the further limitation and condition that 
such additional expenses shall be made available to provide for 
the procurement of a bachelor's degree or its equivalent, based 
S^ <%> .A. JL. <w «-U ^ U l l i U l * «_u.illN- i l l U U l X v U i . U U x ^ u X U U i i j ^j U v 
8. The Defendant shall be entitled to claim dependency 
exemptions for the minor children of the parties whenever either 
_A-
party is entitled to claim the dependency exemptions under 
Section 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended. Plaintiff shall sign and provide to Defendant a 
Declaration required by the Internal Revenue Service to 
implement such claim, 
9. The Defendant shall pay all medical and dental 
expenses of the minor children of the parties until each attains 
their respective majority, and thereafter, so long as any such 
child or children are fully matriculated in college in 
accordance with the provisions set forth hereinabove. 
10. The Defendant shall maintain a policy of health 
insurance for the benefit of the Plaintiff consistent with that 
which has been previously in effect so long as such insurance is 
availaole to the Defendant through his business or employment. 
A copy of such policy shall be immediately provided to Plaintiff, 
11. With the exception of those assets and monies 
referred to hereinabove, the Defendant shall be awarded as his 
sole and separate properties, free and clear of any lien or 
claim on the part of Plaintiff, each and every other asset 
owned, acquired, or which either of the parties claim any right, 
title or interest therein, whether real, personal, mixed, 
tangible or intangible, including, but not limited to, the 
following: 
a. all stock in and to David Early Tires, Inc., 
issuea or ocnei.wj.be, beueua utb cxpuoi uionb, yuail Creek 
Vmyard, their successors or predecessors, in the name of 
the Plaintiff and/or Defendant, or which Plaintiff may 
claim any right, title or interest therein. 
b. the Defendant shall have and retain as his sole, 
individual and separate property all of the interests in 
certain businesses known as David Early Tires, Inc., 
Galeria des Expositions and Quail Creek Vinyard. Said 
businesses are operated by David w. Early, including 
stock and other choses in action, free of any claim or 
interest of Plaintiff, and Plaintiff shall execute any 
and all necessary documents and instruments, including 
endorsement and delivery of stock, if any, to effect the 
intent and purpose of this clause. Defendant shall 
indemnify and save Plaintiff harmless on any and all 
obligations, claims, and demands against her as a result 
of past, present or future operation of such businesses. 
c. Each and every parcel of real property, 
wheresoever and whatsoever owned by the Plaintiff and/or 
Defendant, or either of them, and in this regard, the 
said Plaintiff shall execute and deliver to the Defendant 
such deeds of conveyance as may be necessary or 
appropriate to convey and relinquish all of her right, 
title or interest therein in favor of the said 
Defendant. The Plaintiff specifically represents that 
she has not executed any assignment, conveyance, 
hypothecation, lien, or other encumbrance against any 
such parcel or parcels of real property, except those 
liens executed by Plaintiff and Defendant jointly. 
- f i -
d. All assets or interests in any and all 
partnership or partnerships, corporations, patents, trade 
names, licenses, stock and choses in action of any kind, 
nature or description, whatsoever owned by the parties, 
or either of them, as of the date of this Stipulation. 
e. All personal property and possessions now in his 
possession. 
12. Defendant shall assume and pay all debts and 
obligations attendant to or arising from the assets which he is 
awarded and are distributed to him, and shall further indemnify 
and protect the Plaintiff against any debts and obligations of 
the business identified as "David Early Tires, Inc.," its retail 
store locations, all tax liabilities, including state and 
federal income tax liabilities of the parties prior to the date 
of the execution of this stipulation. Be it provided, however, 
that with respect to any federal, state or local income tax 
liabilities arising from the income of Susan Early which has not 
been disclosed to the Defendant shall be and remain her sole and 
separate liability, and said Plaintiff shall indemnify and 
protect the Defendant against any such liabilities. 
13. The Plaintiff shall assume and pay the separate 
debts and obligations which she has incurred subsequent to the 
separation of the parties, excepting those which, by previous 
order of the Court, Defendant is obliged to pay, and shall 
indemnify and hold the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
14. The parties shall file joint federal and state 
income tax returns for the year 1987 and prior thereto. With 
respect to said joint returns, David Early shall have the sole 
responsibility for any deficiency or assessment and shall have 
the sole right to any refund, carry forward or carry back. 
David Early shall take any actions he deems necessary to 
prosecute any refund or defend any deficiency or assessment and 
shall solely pay all costs incurred. Susan Early shall waive 
any right to refunds and shall cooperate fully and promptly in 
these matters, including executing a power of attorney and any 
other necessary instruments, providing information and testimony 
and endorsing any refund checks or vouchers. 
15. Each of the parties waives and relinquishes any and 
all right or claim to alimony. 
16. Certain monies have been advanced by the Defendant 
for the account of the Plaintiff to defray certain costs of 
litigation, including attorneys1 fees, appraisal fees and 
accountants1 fees. In this regard, the Plaintiff shall have no 
obligation to account for or repay any such funds. Each party 
shall be responsible for their respective costs and attorneys1 
fees incurred herein. 
17. Concurrent with the execution of this final Decree 
of Divorce and Judgment herein, the parties shall execute mutual 
releases between one another. 
DATED this day of October, 1988. 
BY THE COURT 
By 
RICHARD H. MOFFAT, Judge 
_ Q _ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BURBIDGE/X MLTCI 
RICHARD D. ^ ORSlp^E 
Attorneys f oo-Plaintif f 
WALL & WALL 
BY. 
-€-BRANT H. WALL 
ttorneys for Defendant 
dd0209a 
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ADDENDUM "E" 
PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., #0492 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN EARLY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID WARREN EARLY, ] 
Defendants. ] 
i AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN EARLY 
) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
) ORDER OF CONTEMPT AND JUDGMEN' 
1 Civil No. D86-04771 
1 Richard H. Moffat, Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, SUSAN EARLY, being first duly sworn do say: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-referenced action. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct 
copies of expenses incurred at the parties' home located at 4061 
Powers Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah. All expenses as outlined 
below have been pro rated as of October 27, 1988; the date of 
execution of the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement 
entered into in the above-referenced matter. Expenses incurred 
which are subject to the court's order include: 
a. Utah Power and Light bill covering services from 
September 21, 1988, to October 21, 1988 in the amount of $413.05; 
b. Mountain Fuel bill covering expenses incurred from 
October 3, 1988 through November, 1, 1988, totalling $553.22. A 
prorated amount due is $461.00; 
c. U.S. West bill for services from October 7, 1988, 
through November 6, 1988, totalling $173.09. The prorated amount 
due is $117.18; and 
d. County Treasurer bill for general property taxes on 
the residence from January 1, 1988 through December 31, 1988, 
totalling $3,923.14. The prorated amount due is $3,325.00; 
3. There remains due and owing a total of $495.85 for 
expenses incurred from July through October on the 1984 Audi. 
4. Defendant was ordered by this court to provided 
$3,000.00 per month for temporary alimony and child support. There 
remains due and owing the sum of $2,612.79, representing the 
prorated amount of alimony and child suppport for the month of 
October. 
5. As outlined herein, Defendant is indebted in the 
amount of $7,424.87, .this amount remains due and owing. 
DATED this UP ^ day of February, 1989. 
SUSAN EARLY 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this Q7^ day of 
February, 1989. A » 
<"*•"• <*> #•> totV*£kfc 
ddEarly.Aff J 
ADDENDUM "Fn 
DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT 
BRANT H. WALL, NO. 3 364 
I [WALL & WALL, a.p.c. 
|Attorney for Defendant 
.Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
[Telephone: (801) 521-8220 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY | 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN H. EARLY, | 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT OF 
: DAVID W. EARLY | 
vs. 
: Civil No. D86-4771 | 
DAVID W. EARLY, j 
: HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
r 
DAVID W. EARLY, being first duly sworn upon oath/ deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That he is the Defendant identified in the abov£ 
entitled action and familiar with the matters hereinafter set fort 
and contained. I 
2. That on or about December 9, 1988, counsel for thfe 
(Plaintiff submitted to counsel for the Defendant a letter 
I requesting payment of various sums and amounts which the Plaintiff 
i 
contended to be due and owing by virtue of the prior Orders anci 
1
 I 
(rulings of this Court. A copy of said letter is attached hereto1, 
| for identification purposes marked Exhibit "A", and by reference 
i 
I made a part hereof. 
L & WALL {A PC) 
ORNEYS AT LAW 
» BOSTON BUILDING 
AKE CITY UT 84111 
801) S21 8220 
II 
ALL (A P C ) 
rS AT LAW 
HON BUILOtNG 
ITY UTB4U1 
216220 
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3. That in response thereto, Defendant, by and through hii 
counsel, submitted a response letter, together with supporting 
receipts, under date of January 4, 1989. A copy of said letter is 
attached hereto, for identification purposes marked Exhibit MBlf| 
and by reference made a part hereof. 
4. That Affiant has made an analysis of the sums claimed 
by the Plaintiff herein and has further investigated the nature and 
extent of each assertion and believes that the letter of January 4 1 
1989, fairly and accurately sets forth a summary of the Defendant's 
position relative to the various sums claimed to be due and owin$ 
by the Plaintiff. 
5. The obligations in favor of Utah Power and Light 
Company, Mountain Fuel, and U.S. West as described in Paragraph 
2(a), (b), and (c) of Plaintiff1 s Affidavit, are obligations which 
Defendant concedes are appropriate charges and obligations of the 
Defendant. 
6. That prior to the entry of the Judgment and Decree o£ 
Divorce on or about October 28, 1988, Affiant had made such 
payments as were necessary to protect the residential property 
awarded to the Plaintiff; that said mortgage payments did no 
require a payment for "tax and insurance payments11, and the taxe& 
which ultimately became due and payable on the residential dwelling 
awarded to the Plaintiff became due and payable on November 30 
1988. 
7. That no tax or insurance payments were required under 
the existing mortgage pertaining to the residential property 
awarded to the Plaintiff. 
1 
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8. That the item of $495.85 for expenses incurred on th4 
Audi automobile have been approved as an appropriate obligation of 
the Defendant as outlined in Defendant's response by his counsel to 
counsel for the Plaintiff under letter dated January 4, 198? 
(Exhibit "B"). 
9. That Defendant has acknowledged the sum of $2,612.79 a^ 
an appropriate obligation of the Defendant for child support an 
alimony for the prorated portion of the month of October, 1988, an 
has so advised the Plaintiff (see Exhibit MB"). 
10. That the Stipulation of the parties dated October 13 ,j 
1988, which was submitted as the basis for the Judgment entere 
herein contains a provision under Paragraph 12 that the Plaintiff 
agrees to assume and pay the separate debts and obligations which 
she has incurred subsequent to the separation of the parties] 
except those which by Order of the Court the Defendant is obligated 
to pay. j 
11. That the parties separated on or about October 13 J 
1986, and since that date and prior to the entry of the Decree off 
Divorce, the said Defendant received and and has caused to be paid 
for the benefit of the Plaintiff the following debts and 
obligations incurred by the Plaintiff, which Affiant claims and 
contends constitute personal debts and obligations of the Plaintiff 
which she was obligated to pay and discharge pursuant to the prior 
Orders of this Court and the Stipulation of the parties: . I 
A) A bill to Domus in the sum of $800 for personal items 
purchase from the boutique. 
& WALL (A P C ) 
IRN6YS AT LAW 
I BOSTON BUILDING 
X£ CITY UT S41H 
01) 521 6220 
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B) A bill to R. C. Willey in the sum of $475.82 for 
furniture for Plaintiff's residence. 
C) A bill to Pool Professionals in the sum of $89.69 for I 
servicing the pool at Plaintiff's residence. 
D) A bill to Palmer Wholesale in the sum of $321.85 for 
plants and/or flowers. 
E) ' Bills to ZCMI in the total amount of $4,619.15 for 
personal items and clothing. 
F) Bills to Zions in the total amount of 551.66 for 
Plaintiff's revolving charge account. 
G) A bill to Bonneville Heat in the sum of $44.50 for the 
heater repair at Plaintiff's residence. 
H) A bill to Blooming Sales in the sum of $347.02 for 
flowers and/or plants. 
I) Bills to The Cottonwood Club in the total amount of 
$1,446.39 for Plaintiff's membership dues and accompanying 
charges. 
J) A bill to Jerry Coleman in the sum of $4/319.19, who I 
was a painter hired by Plaintiff to paint Plaintiff's 
residence. 
* K) A bill to Stevens & Brown in the sum of $1,430.51 for 
personal sporting goods and equipment for Plaintiff. 
12. That by reason of the foregoing, the said Defendant 
has paid for the use and benefit of the Plaintiff a total oJ£ 
$15,444.71, which were and are obligations which the Plaintiff wajs 
obliged and obligated to pay by virtue of the prior rulings of thip 
Court and the Stipulation and Judgment entered herein. 
-5-
13. That after allowing the Plaintiff a credit as se 
forth hereinabove, there remains the sum of $11,344,84, which 
Affiant contends to be a credit and sum due and owing to him by th£ 
Plaintiff based upon the prior Orders of this Court and Stipulation 
of the parties as aforesaid. 
14. Further Affiant saith naught. 
DATED this 2T1 day of February, 1989. 
\ WALL {A P C ) 
INEYS AT LAW 
BOSTON BUILCXNG 
£ CITY U T H i t t 
>1)S214220 
k \AA\,WW^II^ 
DAVID W. EARLY 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this -0~)^'^ day o 
February, 1989. 
/ . • •>/ YUJu.A r ^t A.A 
J^AR^f NO(£ Yj PUBLIC 
R e s i d i n g a t S a l t Lake C o u n t y , Utah 
